because various other factors are considered to be relevant, such as the fact that ICANN is based in the USA (as is the case with most of the root servers) and therefore is subject to US law. Recently, ICANN entered into a new agreement with the US Government that should result in more autonomy for ICANN by 2009. 28 Nevertheless, ICANN's role remains highly debated.
29
One of the instruments within the present structure to counterbalance these issues is the existence of the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), which represents countries that are interested in Internet Governance.
30
The GAC has adopted principles and guidelines for the delegation and administration of ccTLDs. 31 The principles underline the national responsibilities for ccTLDs. Actually, according to the document … the main principle is the principle of subsidiarity. ccTLD policy should be set locally … Most of the ccTLD policy issues are local in nature and should therefore be addressed by the local Internet community according to national law.
Article 4.1 goes even further by claiming that ultimate public policy authority over the relevant ccTLD rests with the relevant government or public authority. And every country or distinct economy with a government or public authority should be able to ask for its appropriate country code to be represented as a ccTLD and to designate the registry. The GAC principles
are not undisputed and, as such, are not a condition for the relationship between ICANN and the registries. It is interesting to notice that the new agreement between ICANN and the US Government contains a specific paragraph about the GAC: ICANN is to work with the GAC to review the role of the GAC within ICANN "so as to facilitate effective considerations of GAC advice on the public policy aspects of the technical coordination of the Internet". This seems to hint at a stronger involvement of the GAC and at a greater role for its principles on the delegation and administration of ccTLDs.
The European Dimension
The EU has constantly tried to increase its influence on ICANN and related governance issues. 32 It has sought to limit the control by the US Government over ICANN and has supported attempts to increase the role of national governments in ICANN's operations, for example through the GAC. In fact, 31 Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), GAC Principles and Guidelines for delegation & administration of ccTLDs <http://gac.icann.org> (GAC 2005) . This is the current version of the principles; the original version was adopted in 2000. 32 More information on the EU and Internet governance can be found at the website of the EU: <http://ec.europa.
eu/information_society/policy/internet_gov/index_en.htm>.
the secretariat of the GAC has been run by the European Commission for quite some time. The GAC principles were influenced by the EU, and the EU strongly supported the various statements made during the WSIS conference on the ccTLDs. 33 Although its suggestions were not fully incorporated in the governance model of ICANN, the subsequent efforts of the Commission to influence ICANN's functioning through the GAC have been moving in the same direction.
National and European Assignment of Domain Names
In this section we look at the institutional design for the allocation of domain names at the national and European level. The various models are mentioned and a more in-depth analysis is made of the .eu model.
Institutional Aspects
The national institutional arrangements underlying the assignment of domain names are poised between the two extremes of private and public governance. In its pure version, private governance consists of selfregulation mechanisms, occurring "when those regulated design and enforce the rules themselves" 34 , whereas its counterpart refers to the traditional "command and control" state-dominated governance. However, in the contemporary legal orders these two models of governance are not usually interest. This in turn brings about different institutional structures, based on the delegation of the regulatory tasks to bodies that operate at arm's length from the government ("agencies").
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If one looks at the national registries, one can see that certain registries are acting on a very independent basis with hardly any regulatory framework.
In other countries the registry is more or less a fully government controlled entity. though, is that all the policies adopted at the EU level contain, at least to a certain extent, some private governance characteristics. This is partly a result of the decentralized and complex nature of the Internet and of the immense influence exerted by the strongly organized Internet community. More than that, in some parts of the EU Internet policy, recourse is made exclusively to private governance mechanisms, as it was the case, for instance, in the initial Safer Internet Action Plan, which incited the development and implementation of adequate systems of self-regulation in the fields of illegal and harmful Internet content.
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In the vast majority of cases, a mixture of the above defined models of governance is found within one and the same Internet policy field. This is the case, for example, with the e-commerce framework, where the encouragement of codes of conduct and alternative dispute resolution Most national registries "received" the right to manage the national domains in the early days of the Internet. 44 The authority, sometimes given to individuals, was then passed on to other organizations or to "natural"
successors. Because of this organic process, the institutional design differs from country to country. This is the main reason why this contribution does not look into the various national structures for the allocation of domain names. Instead, the focus is on the recently developed .eu model, because it reflects in a much more structured way the various issues that are at stake.
The .eu Model

Towards the Adoption of the .eu TLD
The first steps towards the adoption of the .eu TLD were taken in 1997 procedures, the responses were divided between the uniform alternative dispute resolution initiated by ICANN and that of a European forum. Lastly, there were many variations in the views on the different policy issues.
In July 2000, the Commission presented a Communication on how the creation of the .eu TLD was progressing, whereby it set out the principal results of the public consultation and its conclusions and drew the next steps to be taken. 47 The Communication made apparent the Commission's determination to promote a mixed governance in the regime to be applied to the .eu domain. On the one hand, the Commission endorsed the solution supported by the majority of the respondents, namely that the registry should be a not-for-profit private entity independent of the EU policy structure and that it should be assigned the .eu code for a limited period by means The Regulation stipulates that the implementation of the .eu TLD may take into consideration best practices in this regard and could be supported by voluntary guidelines or codes of conduct where appropriate. In accordance with the service contract between the Commission and EURID, a code of conduct is to be designed by EURID and proposed to the interested parties for consultation. However, the Commission has to be duly consulted on those matters for which it has competences and must ensure that the codes comply with public policy rules.
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All in all, a public-private partnership model of governance is established, whereby the registry (a private operator that is separate from but legally answerable to the Commission) adopts its registration policy in consultation with the stakeholders and the Commission, and in accordance with the public policy rules set out by the latter. In implementing the .eu TLD, the registry is called upon to play a role as the central node of a transnational network of other private operators, with the Internet community being in a position to substantially influence its policies. Such private governance mechanisms as self-regulation and alternative dispute resolution are designed to form part of this architecture, although under parameters drawn from public policy considerations and established by the Commission.
The Public Policy Rules
The rules that lay down the public policy parameters concerning the implementation and functions of the .eu TLD and the principles governing In general, the provisions of this Regulation further exhibit features of publicprivate partnership for the governance of the .eu TLD. On the one hand, those features are reflected in the institutional arrangements set out by the regulation; on the other hand, the substantive or procedural rules applying to the .eu TLD as such are an illustration of private or public governance elements. This is because, bearing in mind that they were set out by the Commission, the more or less intrusive nature of these rules is indicative of the degree of public interference in the shaping of the .eu policy. The following are the main issues of the Regulation. a certain degree of private governance, whereas the registrar's obligation to observe the public policy rules indicates the opposite.
In addition, some specific procedural rules are set out stipulating the registrars' obligation to forward requests in the chronological order in which they received them, and to require applicants to submit accurate and reliable contact details of the person responsible for the technical operation of the domain name that is being applied for. Lastly, a private governance element is inserted by the provision empowering registrars to develop label, authentication and trust mark schemes to promote consumer confidence in the reliability of information that is available under a domain name, in accordance with applicable national and Community law. 
8.
The rules contain specific provisions on the revocation of domain names (articles 18-21). Besides traditional reasons for revocation (e.g. non-payment of the registration fee), particular attention is given to speculative and abusive registrations. Such registrations can be at stake in the case of issues related to property rights as well as when a domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith. For example, the rules forbid the acquisition of domain names for the purpose of selling or renting, or in order to behave in an anticompetitive or abusive manner.
9.
As mentioned above, the registry is responsible for implementing an extra-judicial settlement of conflicts policy that takes into consideration the recommendations of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The regime for dispute resolution can be found in articles 22-23 of the policy rules). The registry is to select the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) providers (EURID has appointed the Prague-based arbitration court for this purpose). Although the availability of an ADR procedure amounts to a great degree of private governance, the power of the registry to shape an ADR policy has been considerably circumscribed by the provisions of the public policy rules. For example, the rules refer in detail to the cases in which an ADR procedure may be initiated by a party, namely when a registration is speculative or abusive, or when a decision taken by the registry conflicts with the policy rules. In addition, specific rules are stipulated to govern the procedure concerning, for instance, the language, means of communication with the parties, time limits for the different stages of the procedure, the majority required for an ADR decision, the number of members of the ADR panels, etc.
Thus, as the above review shows, the public policy rules introduce many private governance features. Apart from the registry and the registrars, other private actors were introduced in the .eu institutional network, namely the validation agents and, more importantly, the ADR providers. On the other hand, the provision for the adoption of public policy rules by the Commission and the latter's power to oversee their implementation already inserts a public dimension into the .eu governance.
Conclusion
The assignment of domain names represents an important aspect of Internet Governance. Assignment is part of the global discussion about Internet
Governance and is strongly linked to the role of ICANN. Awareness of the importance of the institutional aspects of domain names is clearly increasing.
Here, at least two trends can be identified, namely the growing focus on national involvement and, subsequently, the growing emphasis on national regulatory embedment. As far as the latter is concerned, the creation and structuring of the .eu TLD is used as an example in this article. The .eu regime deals with a broad range of topics in order to safeguard the fair allocation of domain names, data privacy, intellectual property and related rights, geographical names, etc. For this purpose, it is not possible to rely exclusively on the discretion of such a highly specialized entity as the registry, as it would likely prove to be ill-suited to take into full consideration and to weigh up the different interests affected by its policies. Therefore, the private entities entrusted with the task of implementing the .eu TLD needed to become bound to take into account those parameters in the exercise of their self-regulatory functions under the oversight of the European Commission.
An indication of the impact of the chosen institutional design is the detail in which such rules are drawn. The public policy rules that have been adopted considerably influence the exercise of the self-regulatory remit of the private actors involved in the .eu scheme. This remit is further affected by the influential institutional position of the Commission in the .eu regime. Instead of the detailed level of regulation in the public policy rules, it might have been sufficient enough to indicate the relevant topics in a more general way and to leave it up to the registry to deal with the further implementation (i.e. in bylaws that then could be subject to approval by the European Commission).
Such a process would also allow for more flexibility. Changing the public policy rules now requires an amended Commission Regulation which takes quite some time. Topics like the revocation of domain names, speculative/ abusive registrations and a dispute resolution procedure might need quick adaptation in order to remain in line with the needs of the parties involved.
Nevertheless, the .eu structure offers a broad scope of relevant aspects that are worth taking into account when addressing the issue of regulating the assignment of domain names.
